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   Bad Blood, Good Movie?

 

Laurie Kelley and Paul Clement

A Viewer’s Guide:

New Documentary about

Hemophilia HIV History

 

A new film about hemophilia during the HIV crisis of the 1980s has energized our community. Bad Blood documents events that caused the mass contamination of factor products. Community advocates cheer the movie’s release and hope it will bring more attention to the hemophilia community—for funds, for continued blood safety, and for preserving memories of our fallen heroes.  But will Bad Blood needlessly raise fears about plasma-derived products? Most Americans with hemophilia use recombinant products, and most don’t fully understand the difference between product safety and purity. Many of us aren’t aware of the complex production of products, or the fact that all US products are now considered safe.  Use of plasma-derived products is on the rise as a treatment for inhibitors—and parents are worried. Now, along comes a film that taps into a parent’s deepest fear: what am I injecting into my child? Will this new documentary reinforce that fear, preventing parents from making good product choices?

 

Flashback

It was November 2008, the opening event of National Hemophilia Foundation’s annual meeting in Denver. The audience of hemophilia families and hemophilia chapter representatives filed into a large, festive room decorated with red and blue balloons. Seating sections were marked with state names, just like a national political convention.

An empty stage awaited Val Bias, new CEO of NHF.  With President Obama just elected, it seemed that NHF was ready to celebrate, too.

 

But then, without warning, the lights went out. People hushed. Two screens on either side of the stage lit up, and a movie trailer was unveiled.  The music was somber, haunting.

 

The scenes were disturbing: Technicians poured gallons of plasma into vats.  Scruffy-looking men donated plasma.  Young children were tethered to bleak hospital beds by IVs dripping cryoprecipitate.  People with hemophilia unknowingly injected themselves with contaminated factor.  The festive mood of the opening ceremony vaporized.  The six-minute trailer caused a huge stir. A small group of older patients enthusiastically applauded. But other attendees were perplexed, and some pharmaceutical reps were angered. What was the point of showing the dramatic film trailer? Wasn’t the community past all this by now? Some worried: Had something new happened to the blood supply? Or would the documentary promoted by the trailer shed new light on this devastating tragedy?  

 

The feature-length documentary Bad Blood premiered on July 28, 2010, in New York City for a select group of people in the hemophilia community.  Now, NHF is encouraging chapters to show the film to its members. But is this documentary appropriate and educational? Or is it the shocker that the trailer led us to expect? Should you see it?  In short, yes. You should see Bad Blood. It’s a powerful and remarkable movie. More than just documenting the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV)contamination of the 1980s, the film also portrays the birth of advocacy in the hemophilia community. But before you watch the film, read our analysis. We hope to prepare you with a balanced look at the documentary, and present some key points to help you betterunderstand the history of factor product development and blood safety today.

 

From A Friendship, A Promise

The origins of Bad Blood are personal.  This film wasn’t made because of a sudden, new threat to the nation’s blood supply. Nor because of new evidence about contamination during the late 1970s and early 1980s. Originally, this was a documentary by award-winning filmmaker Marilyn Ness, who wanted to tell the story of a friend who contracted HIV. But Ness’s film eventually developed into much, much more.  “The project started in 1999,”

 

Ness recalls. “when my friend Matthew Kleiner, who had hemophilia, told me how he became HIV positive. It blew me away. He told me how [HIV-infectedfactor products] had happened, and we both knew, the full scope had not yet

been understood.”

 

But, explains Ness, “in 2000 many people couldn’t speak to me, as litigation was still ongoing. I had to stop the project.”  A class action lawsuit had been filed against pharmaceutical manufacturers on behalf of the estimated 10,000 patientswith hemophilia infected by contaminated factor concentrates. Following the lawsuit’s settlement, the film’s scope grew. “People were desperate to talk to me,” Marilyn reveals. “I picked up the project again later in 2006. I knew this story was relevant even beyond the bleeding disorder community—there was a lot to learn about FDA [US Food and Drug Administration] reform; how do you weigh safety against profit?”

 

Guide to the Players and Plot

Bad Blood portrays one of the most extraordinary stories in medical history.  Strange symptoms afflicting primarily gay men in the early 1980s led researchers to discover a new virus that slowly destroys the body’s immune system, allowing opportunistic infections to flourish. The virus was also noted in certain other populations: drug users; Haitians living in the US; and people with hemophilia.

 

Why people with hemophilia? By the late 1970s, factor was being made from increasingly larger pools of plasma, each containing 10,000 to 60,000 donations.  It took only one donation of plasma containing HIV to contaminate the entire pool, consequently contaminating each “lot” of factor concentrate produced from that pool. As a result of infusing this contaminated factor, about half of the estimated 20,000 people with hemophilia in the US became infected with HIV, and even more with hepatitis C.  The epidemic exposed deadly flaws in the US plasma collection system. As Americans began to realize that this virus had contaminated the nation’s blood supply, government reaction was tragically slow, despite urgent warnings from the US Centers for Disease Control (CDC). Many believe that because the victims were members of the “4-H club”— heroin users, homosexuals, hemophiliacs and Haitians—they commanded little attention and sympathy from the media and the government. And even NHF recommended that patients continue using factor concentrates.

 

Matt Kleiner is the unfortunate star of Bad Blood. The cast also features the FDA and CDC, and the four manufacturers of clotting factor concentrates in the early 1980s: Bayer (Miles/Cutter Laboratories), Baxter (Hyland Laboratories), Armour Pharmaceuticals, and Alpha Therapeutic. Also appearing are national hemophilia organizations like NHF and Committee of Ten Thousand (COTT). And the supporting cast?  The blood donors and the people with hemophilia.

 

The film attempts to capture the perspectives of all these players. “This was a cautionary tale for all drug companies, patients, and FDA interactions,”

 

Ness stresses. “It’s an emotional and impactful story. It’s about how all these people felt betrayed—by science, by technology, by those they trusted—all the way around. There hadn’t really been a film about this tragic story that put into context the lives they lived before AIDS emerged, especially now with twenty years’ hindsight.” How to portray an era in which blame dominated, lawsuits were launched, and thousands of young men died? Could a filmmaker touch on so many sensitive subjects fairly, given that her close friend had died, and not leave an audience of new families with hemophilia scared to use their factor products?

 

Jan Bult, president of Plasma Protein Therapeutic Association (PPTA), which represents manufacturers of plasma protein therapies, viewed the trailer at the 2008 meeting and wondered what the full-length film would be like. He recalls, “I feared Bad Blood wouldn’t be balanced, and that it would create a fear factor for young parents who depend on these life therapies.”

 

For Mature Audiences Only

The trailer set the tone for the documentary’s release, provoking concerns that the film would not be balanced. Some worried that Ness would use docudrama techniques like those used by director Michael Moore in Fahrenheit 9/11, which might scare patients away from plasma-derived products. The trailer had the plasma products industry on pins and needles.

 

“I think people were unprepared for the powerful images and narrative presented in the initial trailer,” remarks Chris Healey, vice president, Government and Public Affairs at Grifols, a manufacturer of plasma-derived factor. “The 2008 NHF annual meeting in Denver was an exciting time, full of hope and energy. When the film trailer was shown at the opening session with little warning or context for the audience, it seemed as though that energy and excitement left the room.”

 

And Ness stresses, “The trailer was never intended for this [NHF] forum.” She explains, “I’m usually present, someone from Blood Safety1 is usually present; it’s carefully handled. Showing it to an auditorium full of people without the Q&A following was not intended.

 

When the response was negative in some quarters, I was disappointed. It was scary for some. But people did respond to it and it helped me raise money for the film.  Two people who responded were Shari and Stephen Bender of New York, whose daughter Rose has hemophilia.  “Stephen and I were moved by the trailer,” recalls Shari. “It was so powerful that we both decided to help fundraise to make [the movie] happen.  The tragedy of the HIV crisis fortunately did not affect us—but we need to remember the past, remain vigilant, and demand a safer blood system.” She notes, “Many HIV remembrance events are not well attended. As president of the New York City Hemophilia Chapter, I think many new parents are forgetting the past, and they need to know.”

 

Kendra Baker is a young mother of two sons with hemophilia. Both Wyatt and Gavin were born many years after the HIV contamination. Despite her sons’ good health, Baker lost five relatives with hemophilia to HIV. The question of blood product safety weighs on her now: Wyatt has an inhibitor, and recently her HTC suggested trying a plasma-derived product for Immune Tolerance Induction (ITI), to lower the inhibitor. “I’m concerned about switching to plasma products, because I know my family’s history,” says Baker. “I know that plasma products are safer now; other people say they use them every day and they work. But I asked my hematologist, who I love and trust, ‘Can you guarantee me five years from now we will not have problems?’ She said that while we know more now than then, she still can’t guarantee anything.”  Baker notes, “That’s the same story we heard back then. I just am not comfortable using plasma-derived.”

 

Baker would gain no comfort from the first 47 seconds of Bad Blood, which aims for shock value, as the audience hears or sees these words: hemophilia holocaust, lawsuit, lawyers, tainted blood, pharmaceutical industry. The film begins with a lawyer—who specializes in suing pharmaceutical companies—blaming pharma for putting profits above safety. With an opening like this, community members, especially those new to hemophilia, need some guidance. Ideally, viewers could avoid unnecessary fears when they see Bad Blood if informed and experienced blood industry experts are available. “I don’t think families living with a bleeding disorder who are unaware of this history are prepared to see this [film] without some conversation beforehand,” says Mark Zatyrka, who contracted HIV and hepatitis C from a transfusion to treat his hemophilia, and who is a founder of the Connecticut Hemophilia Society. “It’s important that some discussion happen before showing the film, and it’s important to have follow-up afterwards. You can expect there will be lots of questions.”

 

In any case, before you see Bad Blood, you should know what the film gets right, and what it omits.

 

What the Film Got Right

Bad Blood is a powerful testimony to the suffering of people with hemophilia.  Rare archival footage accurately portrays life for them in the 1950s and 1960s, before factor concentrates: patients receiving plasma or cryoprecipitate; hemophilic children walking in their backyards or being admitted to the hospital. Parents of young children today will be emotionally touched by the scenes of suffering and frequent hospital stays of children with hemophilia.  This glimpse into history paves the way for us to understand the intense gratitude of families and physicians for the advent of clotting factor concentrates, which ended much pain, reduced long hospital stays, and made life more normal.

 

Ness gives us an excellent overview of hemophilia: what it is, how it’s transmitted, how untreated bleeding eventually cripples. Accurate diagrams and animated graphics enhance the information.  Bad Blood also reviews the history of treatment: from nothing at all to whole blood, from fresh frozen plasma to cryo, and eventually to factor concentrates.  The outstanding historical review is complete with photos and testimonials from patients today who recall the pain they endured as a result of ineffective treatments.

 

We learn how factor products were made in the 1970s: how blood plasma was collected, pooled and processed. At first, factor seems a miracle product, but the film exposes the reality. By today’s standards, this early era of blood processing can look grim and even unsanitary. Images of impoverished or sickly-looking people donating plasma remind us of government and industry’s low standards for plasma collection thirty years ago.

 

Bad Blood accurately portrays how poor oversight of the plasma collection industry set the stage for widespread viral contamination. The medical community and government already knew that hepatitis was in clotting factor. But everyone—government, physicians, patients, industry—tolerated it, because they considered these viral infections

largely benign, and they believed that a greatly increased quality of life outweighed the risk of viral infection. The stage was set for disaster.

 

Overall, the film is a detailed timeline of one of the worst medical disasters in history. It’s told through photos, and through the narratives of several people involved: physicians Dr. Shelby Dietrich and Dr. Bruce Evatt; patients Bob Massie, Matt Kleiner, and Glenn Pierce; journalist Donna Shaw; lawyer Eric Weinberg; and a single pharmaceutical representative, David Castaldi, president of Baxter/Hyland from 1977 to 1987. Ness adeptly weaves the timeline with many personal stories and perspectives. Bad Blood is heart-wrenching, sad, impressive, and educational.

 

And it’s backed by a plethora of documents, collected from the pharmaceutical companies, FDA and NHF, chronicling the impending disaster. These documents reveal that some companies engaged in cover-ups and scandalous practices—including one that shipped product overseas, knowing it was likely contaminated, when the company could no longer sell it in the US.

 

Ness considers her film a balanced portrayal of viewpoints. “It was a challenge,” she says. “My goal was to let each person tell the story from their perspective. We struggled hard and long someone from the drug companies, and the caregivers, and the FDA, and the families allows people a firsthand glimpse into how a crisis unfolds. I think we fairly portrayed everyone’s point of view.”

 

What the Film Missed

Ness believes she did her homework well, noting, “We needed three sources for every statement of fact in the film.”  Renowned physician Dr. Bruce Evatt of the CDC, who was one of the first to sound the alarm that HIV was spreading through the blood supply, reviewed the film for accuracy.

 

But the film is not without bias and several omissions. The AIDS epidemic is presented mostly from the viewpoint of people with hemophilia who have HIV or who lost loved ones, and not from the viewpoint of pharmaceutical companies, scientists, or the FDA. The context in which decisions were made regarding hepatitis, HIV, and product treatments is incomplete. For example, the film offers no explanation of the difficulties of developing a heat-treatment viral inactivation process for factor concentrates, and later, a solvent-detergent treatment. And when these topics are mentioned, around 50 minutes into the film, the FDA is cast as inept, and the drug companies as profit-driven, heartless villains.

 

Ness admits that no pharmaceutical company representative would consent to be interviewed, save Castaldi. Yet Bult, who represents the plasma product producers, was interviewed—and then cut from the film.  Bult described various measures in place today that provide greater product safety—film footage that could allay fears of new parents. But Ness laments that in an 82-minute film, she had to choose “only the most salient issues for the lay audience to comprehend.”

 

Given its length, Bad Blood is a stunning compilation of the history of hemophilia treatment and the unfolding of the HIV crisis. Yet it interprets 30-year-old, complex events in 20/20 hindsight, creating a black-and-white, simplistic story.

 

We’ve identified three key areas where viewers need a deeper understanding to supplement what is shown in the film:

 

1. How the American political climate impacted the FDA and other federal health agencies at the beginning of the AIDS crisis.

2. Basic science about viruses and viral inactivation methods, and the timeline of events, including efforts by pharmaceutical companies.

3. Advances in the safety of plasma-derived products since the 1980s.

 

1. How Politics Impacted the US and FDA

First, let’s look at the political climate surrounding the AIDS era. In 1981, newly elected President Ronald Reagan vowed to reduce the size of government and decrease government oversight of private industry. Subsequent cuts resulted in the loss of almost 10% of the FDA’s workforce of 7,500 employees in 1981. The day after Reagan took office, the FDA commissioner was fired. Over the next few years, the directors of the CDC and National Institutes of Health (NIH), and the Assistant Secretary for Health and Human Services (HHS) all changed, often with substantial intervals before a new appointee.

 

By cutting budgets and personnel, the Reagan administration crippled the enforcement power of the FDA and other health agencies. Many FDA initiatives to inform consumers about the ingredients and side effects of drugs were stopped cold. FDA regulatory inspections dropped by 88%. At the beginning of the AIDS epidemic around 1982, the FDA was shorthanded, demoralized, and in disarray, which greatly compromised its ability to react to the emerging health crisis. 

 

At the same time, the religious right and newly minted “moral majority,” both significant constituents of Reagan’s electorate, used HIV infection to rally against homosexuals. AIDS conspiracy theories abounded, and AIDS hysteria engulfed the country. Bad Blood skillfully portrays the discrimination and hatred experienced by the families of Ricky Ray and Ryan White.

 

2. Heat Treatment:  Not So Simple

Bad Blood might make you wonder, why didn’t companies implement plasma safety procedures earlier? But the science isn’t so simple. The film implies that a heat treatment to kill hepatitis could have been implemented as early as 1980. In hindsight, this could have saved lives by preventing infection with yet-to-be discovered HIV. But companies didn’t implement this safety method for many reasons beyond just profit margin concerns.

 

Since the 1940s, medical science has known that blood products can transmit hepatitis, a liver disease. By the 1970s, two types of hepatitis had been identified: hepatitis A (HAV) and hepatitis B (HBV). Mandatory testing was initiated in 1971 to screen plasma donors for HBV. A test for HAV became available in 1978. By the late 1970s, it was apparent that factor concentrates were also infected with another, yet unknown virus, then called non-A, non-B hepatitis; it slowly attacked the liver, often with no early symptoms. The virus was finally identified in 1989 and named hepatitis C (HCV).

 

Heat treatment had been used for decades to inactivate hepatitis viruses in blood products such as albumin. But early experiments with heat treating factor concentrates in the mid-1970s were disappointing—the factor was destroyed along with the viruses. In Bad Blood, Dr. Evatt remarks that heat treatment was “simple in the end.” But the development of a heat-treatment process for factor VIII was far from simple. In fact, it would become a difficult challenge: the large, very fragile factor VIII protein is easily destroyed by heat. Time-consuming, expensive research involved testing dozens of variables, one at a time, and injecting the product into chimpanzees to see if they developed signs of liver disease.

 

Research into heat treatment of factor concentrates was a low priority in the late 1970s. Infection with hepatitis rarely resulted in serious disease. Patients and hematologists believed that treating people with hemophilia rapidly and more effectively at home, which improved quality of life, more than offset the risk of hepatitis. And at the time, no

one knew that HCV was in the factor—and would eventually become a killer. Hematologists also argued that heat treatment could cause an immune response in patients, resulting in higher incidence of inhibitors, which did occur with two European products a decade later.

 

Research picked up pace in 1980 after scientists working for the small German company Behringwerke published a report suggesting that their heat treatment removed the risk of HBV. Contrary to statements in BadBlood, the Behringwerke report did not prove previous US and European drug company experiments wrong. Nor was the German product hepatitis free—it still transmitted HAV and HCV. Also omitted from the film was the fact that the Behringwerke process resulted in a loss of 75% to over 90% of the factor, and the product cost ten times as much as unheated product.

 

Perhaps the key point overlooked in Bad Blood is that implementing any heat treatment process in 1980 would have required doubling the size of the plasma collection industry, retooling production facilities, and relicensing products—impossible in a short time. If these changes had been implemented, perhaps as many as 90% of people with hemophilia would have been unable to purchase clotting factor concentrate or cryoprecipitate, leaving them with no treatment at all.

 

By 1980, cryo was no longer available as a backup for the vast majority of people with hemophilia. In Bad Blood, Dr. Dietrich notes that trying to return to cryo would have been impossible: the American Red Cross had lost the workforce and infrastructure needed to process large volumes of cryo, and blood centers were unwilling or

unable to process the huge amount of plasma needed.

 

Unlike the film’s portrayal of hematologists at the January 1983 CDC meeting, most hematologists did “get it.” They knew that people with hemophilia were between a rock and a hard place. The film also never mentions that the FDA was expediting approval of virally inactivated clotting factor concentrates: the Baxter heat treated product was approved in just eight months instead of the typical three to six years, and debuted in

March 1983.

 

3. Where the Film Left Off:  Improved Blood Safety

Viewers of Bad Blood will be less fearful if they know what has happened since the 1980s to improve blood safety.  Ness addressed this after the movie premiere on July 28, with a panel discussion that included NHF CEO Val Bias, PPTA’s Jan Bult, and the president of Gay Men’s Health Crisis.  “Someone asked what’s changed and what’s different now,” recalls Mark Zatyrka, “and Jan made clear how industry has changed and what additional safeguards exist now. It was very courageous for him to be there.”

 

Bult says, “Matt Kleiner’s family was at the premiere. After the movie, Matt’s father came to me and said, ‘Thank you for coming; it made us feel good to see what changes have been made.’”

 

Bult continues, “Bad Blood accurately depicts the tragic events that occurred in the hemophilia community in the 1980s.” But, he adds, “Not noted in the film is the safety record of current therapies; there have been no viral transmissions for decades. The movie provides no information on the number of safety and quality initiatives that have been put in place since that time.”

 

And what initiatives have been taken since that time? Hemophilia patients became activists, and forever changed the way blood and blood products are processed and approved in this country—for all citizens. Patient activists like Glenn Pierce, Dana Kuhn, Corey Dubin, and Val Bias were directly responsible for the restructuring of FDA’s Blood Products Advisory Committee and the establishment of a consumer position as one of the committee’s 17 voting members. The hemophilia community was also instrumental in establishing the Advisory Committee on Blood Safety and Availability (ACBSA) in 1997, part of HHS. The committee has 20 members, including at least one consumer member—usually from the hemophilia community.

 

Industry also took initiatives. Pharmaceutical manufacturers listened to consumers and developed recombinant products, which most US hemophilia patients now use, eliminating the use of blood plasma. Pharmaceutical manufacturers also implemented extensive safety measures in collecting and producing plasma products. Gone are the days when plasma was collected from prisoners or people with high-risk behaviors. All donors today are carefully screened, and all plasma-derived products are virally inactivated.

 

Some products even use a double viral-inactivation procedure.  Changes in the plasma collection business implemented since the mid-1980s center on three equally important measures: (1) donor selection, (2) testing for pathogens, and (3) inactivation and removal of pathogens. Industry standards now include:

Qualified Donor Standard. At plasma collection centers, each donor has a physical exam and regular follow-up exams to create a comprehensive health history. The donor must return for a second donation and pass all health and blood tests again before his or her plasma can be used.

60-Day Inventory Hold Standard.  Source plasma is frozen and held in inventory for a minimum of 60 days. This allows any suspect donations to be retrieved and discarded before being considered for use in fractionated blood products.

Implementation of more sensitive viral blood tests. One example is the Nucleic Acid Tests (NAT). Since the late 1990s, NAT has allowed contaminated donations to be detected earlier and removed from the plasma pool.

 

The best news of all? There has been no known transmission of HIV since 1986, and of HCV since 1989. But despite these advances, fear lingers. Baker says, “My HTC told me there hasn’t been a viral transmission in over twenty years using plasma-derived…yet my heart sinks when I hear they might put Wyatt on human product.

 

1. The Advisory Committee on Blood Safety and Availability of the US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).

 

2. The Blood Products Advisory Committee (BPAC) reviews and evaluates data concerning the safety, effectiveness, and appropriate use of blood, and of products derived from blood and serum or from biotechnology.

8 Parent Empowerment Newsletter | November 201

 

 

 

 
 
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